Deutsche Bank

Annual Report 2016

Compensation Structure as of January 2017

  • Simplification of Compensation Structures
  • Obvious link between compensation and previously agreed objectives
  • Strong emphasis on the interests of the shareholders

The structures of the compensation system applicable as of the 2017 financial year are set out below, highlighting the changes to the previously applicable system and giving the reasons for the individual changes. In May 2017, the General Meeting will be given the opportunity to pass a resolution on the approval of the changed compensation system.

Structure and compensation elements of the new compensation system

The compensation system applicable as of January 2017 continues to consist of non performance-related (fixed) and performance-related (variable) components.

Non-Performance-Related Components (Fixed Compensation)

The fixed compensation is not linked to performance and consists of the base salary, contributions to the company pension plan and “other benefits”.

Various factors were considered when determining the appropriate level of the base salary. First, the base salary rewards general assumption of the office of Management Board member and the related overall responsibility of the individual Management Board members. In addition, the compensation paid in the comparable market is taken into account when determining the amount of the base salary. However, a market comparison must take into consideration that the regulatory requirements pursuant to the InstVV set a cap for variable compensation at 200 % of the fixed compensation. Accordingly, the fixed compensation must be determined in a way that ensures competitive compensation in line with market practice while taking into account the aforementioned requirements. The regulatory cap was implemented in 2014; as a consequence, the overall base salaries were increased, and in May 2014, the General Meeting approved the respective increases by a large majority.

The InstVV provides for the possibility to define contributions to the company pension plan as fixed compensation and thus to include these in the basis for calculating the ratio between fixed and variable compensation components. The Supervisory Board reviews the previous entitlement structure of the contributions to the company pension plan and – if applicable – adjusts it.

Additional non-performance-related components include “other benefits”. The “other benefits” comprise the monetary value of non-cash benefits such as company cars and driver services, insurance premiums, expenses for company-related social functions and security measures including payments, if applicable, of taxes on these benefits as well as taxable reimbursements of expenses.

Performance-Related Components (Variable Compensation)

For the 2016 financial year, the variable compensation components were supplemented by a newly introduced component, the Division Performance Award. The implementation of the new component sought to reflect and reward the specific characteristics of the front offices represented on the Management Board in the related objectives. In May 2016, the changes to the system did not receive majority approval by the General Meeting. With respect to the newly implemented compensation component, it was criticized that the structure had become even more complex and less transparent, the introduction of compensation components for only part of the Management Board was not comprehensible and linking the component with the underlying objectives was not convincing.

In light of the criticism expressed, the Supervisory Board substantially simplified the structures of the variable compensation for 2017 and linked compensation to transparent performance criteria. However, the structure still allows for the agreement of individual and divisional objectives alongside collective objectives and makes it possible to achieve competitive pay levels in line with market practice on the basis of the respective member’s area of responsibility and, at the same time, also meets in this respect the regulatory requirements.

The entire variable compensation is performance-related. As of the 2017 financial year, variable compensation will consist of a short term component and a long term component:

  • the Short Term Award and
  • the Long Term Award.

Short-Term Award (STA)

The STA is linked to the achievement of short term and long term objectives. Objectives include collective objectives to be achieved by the Management Board as a whole and individual objectives whose achievement level is determined separately for each member of the Management Board.

In order to clearly distinguish collective objectives from individual objectives, the STA is divided into two components:

  • the Group Component and
  • the Individual Component.

Group Component

The objectives to be achieved form the basis for the calculation of the Group component as part of the STA. The key objective of the Group component is to link the variable compensation for the Management Board to the overall performance of the Bank.

In 2016, the Management Board decided to align part of the variable compensation for non-tariff employees of the Bank more closely with Group performance. This seeks to reward the contribution of all employees to the financial results of the Bank and the achievements in the implementation of our strategy. Management Board compensation is also closely linked to the performance of the Bank using selected key financial figures. The Supervisory Board decided to align the compensation system for the Management Board members more closely with the compensation system for employees. This is achieved by using the performance metrics underlying the Group component in the compensation system for employees as the reference value for the Group component of the STA as of 2017.

In accordance with our targets originally announced in October 2015, four performance metrics constituting important indicators for the capital, risk, cost and return profile of the Bank form the reference value for the Group Component of the STA:

Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1) capital ratio (fully loaded)

The Common Equity Tier-1 Ratio of the Bank in relation to their risk-weighted assets.

Leverage Ratio

The Bank´s Tier 1 capital as a percentage of its total leverage exposure pursuant in line with CRR/CRD 4.

Adjusted costs

Total noninterest expenses, excluding restructuring and severance, litigation, impairment of goodwill and other intangibles and policyholder benefits and claims.

Post-tax return on tangible equity (RoTE)

Net income (or loss) attributable to Deutsche Bank shareholders as a percentage of average tangible shareholders’ equity. The latter is the shareholders’ equity on the bank´s balance sheet, excluding goodwill and other intangible assets.

At the end of a financial year, the Supervisory Board establishes how each of these performance metrics developed compared to the published target figures and determines an achievement level for each performance metric.

The Supervisory Board regularly reviews the selection of the performance metrics. The above four objectives are equally weighted at up to 25 % in the determination of the Group Component of the STA, depending on the achievement level. If, overall, the performance metric-based objectives are not achieved during the period being evaluated, the Supervisory Board may determine that a Group component will not be granted.

Individual Component

The individual component of the STA rewards the achievement of short and medium-term individual and front office-related objectives. These objectives are established by the Supervisory Board as part of the objective setting agreement for the respective financial year’s performance evaluation. The key objectives are designed to contribute to the applicable business policy and strategic objectives of the Bank, in line with each Management Board member’s area of responsibility. In the process, not merely financial success is taken into account, but also the conduct towards staff members and clients as part of carrying out business activities. Objectives for the individual components may for example include revenue developments in the course of the year, project-related targets, diversity objectives or other developments in employee or client satisfaction.

As part of the annual objective setting agreement, corresponding key financial figures and/or factors are set for all objectives that will be used to determine the objective achievement level. A maximum of three objectives per financial year is set for each Management Board member. The sum of individually agreed and business objectives amounts to a maximum of 90 % of the individual component of the STA, depending on the achievement level of the aforementioned objectives. The Supervisory Board decides merely on the remaining portion of 10 % of the individual component to reward outstanding contributions, including project-specific contributions over the course of the financial year as an exercise of its discretionary authority. If, overall, the objectives are not achieved during the period being evaluated, the Supervisory Board may determine that an individual component will not be granted.

Minimum, Target and Maximum Values

The sum of Group-wide and individually agreed objectives amounts to a maximum of 40 % of the total variable compensation, depending on the achievement level of the aforementioned objectives. This is designed to ensure that the individual objectives do not primarily determine the value of the variable compensation. If, overall, the objectives are not achieved during the period being evaluated, the Supervisory Board may determine that an STA will not be granted.

Long-Term Award (LTA)

The Supervisory Board decided to clearly focus on the achievement of long-term objectives when determining the variable compensation. Therefore, the target figure of the LTA constitutes a portion of no less than 60 % of the total variable target compensation. As with the short-term component, the Supervisory Board determines the collective and/or individual long-term objectives for the Management Board members. The achievement level is determined on the basis of the definition of clear performance metrics and/or factors which are to be agreed for these objectives at the beginning of a financial year.

of the variable compensation, as a minimum, relate to the long-term component

The Supervisory Board determines a total of three objectives for each Management Board member. Compared to the previous compensation system, an additional third objective was added to the long-term component. Each objective is equally weighted at 1/3 in the assessment of the LTA.

The relative performance of the Deutsche Bank share in comparison to selected peer institutions remains an objective within the framework of the LTA. This objective is intended to promote the sustainable performance of the Deutsche Bank share. However, the portion of this objective of the LTA was decreased from 2/3 to 1/3 to achieve a better balance. The long-term nature of this objective is supported by the determination of the Relative Total Shareholder Return (RTSR) on the basis of a three-year assessment. The RTSR of Deutsche Bank is derived from the Total Shareholder Return of Deutsche Bank in relation to the average total shareholder returns of a select peer group (calculated in Euro). This LTA portion is calculated from the average of the annual RTSR for the last three financial years (compensation year and the two preceding years). If the three-year average of the relative total shareholder return of Deutsche Bank is greater than 100 %, then the value of the RTSR portion increases proportionately to an upper limit of 150 % of the target figure, i.e., the value increases by 1 % for each percentage point above 100 %. If the three-year average of the relative total shareholder return is lower than 100 %, the value declines disproportionately. If the relative total shareholder return is calculated to be in the range of less than 100 % to 80 %, the value of the Award portion is reduced for each lower percentage point by 2 percentage points. In the range between 80 % and 60 %, the value of the Award portion is reduced for each lower percentage point by 3 percentage points. If the three-year average of the RTSR does not exceed 60 %, the value of the Award portion is set to zero.

The peer group used for the calculation of the relative total shareholder return is selected based on the criteria of generally comparable business activities, comparable size and international presence. The Supervisory Board critically reviewed the peer group as part of the design of the new compensation system and decided to adjust this group in comparison to the previously applicable group. In light of the business activities of the Bank, it was decided to remove the investment bank-centric financial institutions Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley from the peer group, due to the differing business strategy compared to a universal bank. However, the reduced peer group will be supplemented by HSBC, which is also used for comparison with respect to internal benchmarking purposes.

The peer group for the RTSR therefore comprises the following banks:

Peer Group of Deutsche Bank

The second objective is linked to the growth and strengthening of the Bank. Within the notion of organic capital growth on a net basis, the Supervisory Board sets an objective designed to promote this growth.

As before, the third objective is taken from the category “Culture & Clients”. In this context, the Supervisory sets an objective which is linked to corporate culture, client satisfaction and dealing with clients. This objective is linked to the sustainable development of the intrabank environment or designed to foster the development of the relationships to clients. As for the 2017 financial year, one objective set by the Supervisory Board for all Management Board members is again the evaluation of the control environment within the Deutsche Bank Group.

The Long Term Award can be a maximum of 150 % of the respective target figures.

Objectives are established by the Supervisory Board as part of an objective setting agreement at the beginning of the respective financial year for purposes of performance evaluation. For all objectives, financial figures and/or factors are set from which the achievement level of the objectives is transparently derived. The leeway for the discretionary decision is strictly limited to 3 to 6 % with respect to the total variable compensation.

The allocation of the objectives to the individual compensation components is set out below.

Maximum Compensation

The total compensation of a Management Board member is subject to caps. Due to regulatory requirements, the variable compensation is capped at 200 % of the fixed compensation. In addition, the Supervisory Board again set a cap of € 9.85 million for the overall total compensation for the 2017 financial year. Consequently, compensation is capped at a maximum of € 9.85 million, even where the level of the target achievement would result in higher compensation.

A detailed presentation of the figures will be provided in a separate document on the website of the Bank which is not part of the Management Report.